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Abstract
We suggest that one way in which economic analysis is useful is
by o¤ering a critique of reasoning. According to this view, economic
theory may be useful not only by providing predictions, but also by
pointing out weaknesses of arguments. It is argued that, when a the-
ory requires a non-trivial act of interpretation, its roles in producing
predictions and o¤ering critiques vary in a substantial way. We o¤er
a formal model in which these di¤erent roles can be captured.
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Economics: Between Prediction and Criticism
If you put two economists in a room, you get two opinions, unless one of
them is Lord Keynes, in which case you get three opinions. (attributed to
Winston Churchill)
1 Introduction
One view of Economics is that it is a predictive science, with the goal of
generating predictions that can be tested by observations. This view has
many variants. It can refer to the standard conceptualization of models as
approximations of reality, as is often the case in the natural sciences. It
can focus on qualitative rather than quantitative predictions. It can refer
to predictions that are generated by analogies rather than by general rules.
It can focus on notions of explanation and understanding, which may lead
to predictions in a yet-unspecied way. Indeed, the recent literature on the
methodology of economics has o¤ered a variety of ways in which economic
analysis in general, and models in particular, can be understood and used.
(See Gibbard and Varian, 1978, Aumann, 1985, McCloskey, 1985, Hausman,
1992, Maki, 1994, 2005, Cartwright, 1998, in press, Sugden, 2000, Rubinstein,
2006, Grune-Yano¤ and Schweinzer, 2008, Grune-Yano¤, 2009, and Gilboa,
Postlewaite, Samuelson, and Schmeidler, 2014, among others.)
It is easy to nd arguments that Economics has achieved great success
(e.g., Litan [17]) as well as great failure (e.g., Desai [8]) in prediction. But
critics claim that much of Economics fails to generate any predictions. In this
paper, we argue that there is another view of economics as a useful academic
discipline, which has merit even in cases where it fails to commit to specic
predictions. This view suggests that one role of economics is to critique
reasoning about economic questions. If, for example, the government intends
to increase the tax rate on a certain good and expects a certain revenue based
1
on the tax rate and the current volume of trade in the respective market, one
would do well to mention that the quantity of the good demanded is likely to
change as a result of the tax. Such a comment would fall short of calculating
the actual tax revenue expected. Indeed, an economist may nd it di¢ cult
to calculate the elasticity of demand, let alone the general equilibrium e¤ects
of such a tax. Nonetheless, it might be extremely valuable to identify the
fallacy in the naive reasoning based on the current quantity demanded.
Economic analysis may thus be useful simply as a form of criticism. It
may critique reasoning at the very basic level of testing logical deductions, at
a conceptual level, say, by identifying equilibrium e¤ects (as in the example
above), as well as in other ways such as confronting intuition with specic
models or with empirical ndings.1
The distinction between critique and qualitative predictions is not always
clear. In the tax example, by pointing out that the quantity demanded is
likely to respond to a price hike, the economist may make the implicit predic-
tion that tax revenue will be lower than calculated based on current quantity
demanded. But the economist might also be aware of various anomalies for
which demand curves might be upward sloping, or for which the general
equilibrium e¤ect of taxation might be qualitatively di¤erent from its par-
tial equilibrium e¤ect. Thus, she may restrict her claim to the critique of a
proposed line of reasoning without venturing even a qualitative prediction.
What distinguishes the use of an economic theory for prediction and for
critique? One obvious distinction has to do with the context: a critique comes
in response to an existing statement or prediction, whereas a prediction need
not have such a predecessor. Or, put di¤erently, a prediction can be viewed
as a reply to an open-ended question, What is likely to occur?, as opposed
to a critique, which can be thought of as a reply to a yes/no question, Does
the following argument apply?.
1As such, the role of economists can be viewed as helping society reach rational policies,
in Habermass (1981) sense of communicative rationality.
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There is another distinction between the two, which is not context-dependent.
Economic theory employs models that have many possible interpretations,
that is, many possible mappings between formal objects and real ones. One
can imagine situations where, according to all plausible interpretations a
certain outcome follows, as well as situations where there are some such in-
terpretations, and nally situations where there are no such interpretations.
We will say that a theory predicts an outcome if, according to all plausi-
ble interpretations that outcome follows. A theory critiques an argument if,
according to no plausible interpretation does it hold. Of course, when inter-
pretations vary in a non-trivial way, there can be situations where the theory
does not predict an outcome, but also does not critique the claim that this
outcome would transpire.
In Section 2 we o¤er a simple model in which this distinction can be
made precise. We use the model in Section 3 to prove some results about the
complexity of testing whether a theory predicts an outcome, or, conversely,
critiques it. Section 4 then discusses several applications of our model to
questions in the methodology of economics and decision sciences. Section 5
concludes.
2 A Model of Economic Modeling
Our objective is a model of economic modeling. The goal is neither to best
capture economic analysis as it is actually conducted, nor to make a state-
ment about how it should be conducted. Rather, we wish to provide a
framework within which one can discuss the way economists tend to think
about their eld. The model allows a discussion of some complaints about
economics as well as some of its defenses. Importantly, this is a theoret-
ical paper that does not aim to perform the empirical analysis of the way
economists think of their work, and we make no claims about the relative im-
portance of prevalence of the di¤erent interpretations of economic analysis;
3
we only seek to provide the conceptual framework for such analysis.
We present the components of this model in Sections 2.12.5. We com-
plete the model in Section 2.6.
2.1 Descriptions
The rst component of our model of economic modeling is a description. A
description can be thought of as a list of statements in a given language,
describing a certain state of a¤airs. Importantly, descriptions are used both
for the formal entities in an economists model, and for their informal inter-
pretation in terms of real entities. For example, if an economist describes a
bank run phenomenon as a coordination game, she will have a model with
players, strategies, and payo¤s. This model might consist of a game
that includes agents P1 and P2 who can either withdraw their money, W ,
or leave it, L, with the outcomes as in the following table:2
P2 L W
P1
L 10; 10 0; 8
W 8; 0 2; 2.
The economists interpretation of this model will typically refer to various
features of reality, such as investors who may or may not leave their money
in banks. In our model of economic modeling, this interpretation will be
captured by a mapping between two descriptions one of the entities in the
economists model (such as players), and one of the various real entities to
which she refers to (such as investors).
A description begins with a nite set of entities E. The set E can be
thought of as a set of letters in an alphabet. For the bank run model, the
entities include P1; P2; L; and W .3 Formally, we dene the set of possible
2The relationship to a bank run is that an agent contemplates withdrawing her money
only because of uncertainty as to whether the other agent might.
3This is not the complete set of entities for the bank run example, but illustrates the
basic idea. We describe in more detail several examples below.
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lists of entities of a model, E, as:
E = [k1Ek
and let a typical element of E be denoted by e.
The next component of a description is a nite set of predicates F , with
a typical element denoted by f . Like E, the set F is a formal set of letters
(disjoint from E). Predicates are used to attribute properties to entities or to
establish relationships between entities. In the economists bank run model,
P1 and P2 are players in a game and L and W are actions the players
may take. The description of the bank run model would include predicates
players in a game and actions. Predicates will come in di¤erent varieties,
referred to as k-place predicates for various values of k. A 1-place predicate
will indicate whether an entity has a particular property; for example predi-
cate f might be used to designate P1 a player in a game. A 2-place predicate
will describe relationships between pairs of entities. A 3-place predicate will
describe relationships between triples of entities, and so on.
A description will link entities with predicates: P1 is a player in the
game, W is an action a player can take, etc. Formally, a description is a
triple d  (E;F; d), where E is a set of entities, F is a set of predicates, and
d is a function 4
d : E  F ! f0; 1; ; g:
For a k-tuple e 2 Ek and a predicate f , d(e; f) is intended to say whether the
predicate f applies to the list of entities e. The values 1 and 0 are naturally
intended to capture true and false. If P1; P2;W; L 2 E and player in a game
and action are predicates, d(P1;player in a game) = 1 and d(P1;action) = 0.
The value  is used for unknown values, and it will allow us to start with a
description that is partial and augment it by additional facts. Finally, the
4It may often be convenient to expand the range of the function d to a set X =
X0 [ f; g, where X0 contains more elements than simply f0; 1g. This may in particular
allow quantitative theories to be discussed more elegantly. However, it will su¢ ce for our
discussion to take the range of X to be f0; 1; ; g.
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special value  is interpreted as saying that the question, whether f applies
to e, is not meaningful. The value  allows us to describe all (nite-place)
predicates with a single function d rather than having to consider sets of
predicates with varying number of places. In particular, the value  will be
used when the number of places in the predicate f di¤ers from the number
of entities k. For example, we have f(e) =  for any e 2 E2 whenever f is
a 1-place predicate. More generally, for every f 2 F there exists a unique
m  1 such that, for every k 6= m, every e 2 Ek, and every d, we have
d (e; f) = . This m = m (f) will be called the degree of f .5
2.1.1 Compatibility
We will be interested in extendinga description by adding additional struc-
ture to it. Toward that end we dene the notion of compatibility of descrip-
tions.
Two descriptions d = (E;F; d) and d0 = (E;F; d0) are compatible if:
(i) for every e 2 E and every f 2 F ,
d (e; f) =  () d0 (e; f) = 
and (ii) for every e 2 E, every f 2 F , and every x; y 2 f0; 1g, if
d (e; f) = x and d0 (e; f) = y
then x = y.6
5We implicitly assume, therefore, that there is a degree of commonality in the use of
language so that the same predicate f will not be used by di¤erent descriptions to have a
di¤erent number of places.
Observe also that we do not insist that all m-tuples of entities be meaningful for a
predicate of degree m. For example, it makes sense to ask whether a player prefers one
outcome to another, but not whether she prefers an outcome to a strategy, or a player to
a player.
6Here and in the sequel, we refer to strict equalities and universal quantiers when
dening our concepts. Naturally, this is an idealization. In a more realistic model strict
equalities should be replaced by su¢ ciently good approximations, and universal quantiers
by some statistical measures, as in the concept of Probably Approximately Correct.
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Thus, compatible descriptions agree on which statements are meaningful
(condition (i)), and among these they cannot assign to the same statement
two incompatible values in f0; 1g (condition (ii)). However, compatibility
allows the descriptions to di¤er if one of them assumes the value  and the
other takes some value x 2 f0; 1g. Equivalently, the value , designating an
unknown value in f0; 1g, is considered to be compatible with any value in
f0; 1g. In this sense, one can extenda description that is silent on some
aspect to specify that aspect.
2.1.2 Extensions
For two descriptions d = (E;F; d) and d0 = (E;F; d0), we say that d0 is an
extension of d, denoted d0 B d, if:
(i) for every e 2 E and every f 2 F ,
d (e; f) =  () d0 (e; f) = 
and (ii) for every e 2 E, every f 2 F , and every x 2 f0; 1g,
d (e; f) = x =) d0 (e; f) = x:
Thus, a description d0 extends a description d if the two agree on what is
and what isnt a meaningful statement (condition (i)), and, for all meaningful
statements, any statement that appears in d appears in d0 as well (condi-
tion (ii)). As an illustration, consider an initial model of bank runs whose
description includes two outcomes o1 and o2 and a predicate g that indicates
preference. The description d of this model might have d(P1; o1; o2; g) = 
(meaning that it is unknown whether P1 prefers o1 to o2). An extension
d0 might have d0(P1; o1; o2; g) = 1 (meaning that at d0 it is known that P1
prefers o1 to o2).
Clearly, if d0 B d then d and d0 are compatible. However, compatibility
allows d0 to assume a specic value d0 (e; f) = x for x 2 f0; 1g whereas d is
silent about it, that is, d (e; f) = , as well as vice versa. By contrast, for d0
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to be an extension of d, only the former is allowed: d0 species more values
in f0; 1g than does d.
In other words, the extension relation is a subset of the compatibility
relation, dened by having a smaller set of  values (relative to set inclusion).
Thus, if d0 B d we will also refer to d0 as largerthan d, in the sense that
d 1 (0) [ d 1 (1)  d0 1 (0) [ d0 1 (1) :
(And, if d and d0 are compatible, the above inclusion is equivalent to d0 B d).
We can also dene a minimal extensionof a description d that satises a
certain property, where, again, minimality will be with respect to set inclusion
applied to d 1 (0) [ d 1 (1).
2.2 Models
The denitions above hold for any two disjoint sets E;F . However, we will
henceforth save the notation E;F for the sets of entities and of predicates
(respectively) in the economists model. We similarly will want descriptions
of real world problems we confront and hope to understand better with the
use of economistsmodels. For convenience, when we discuss descriptions
of reality we will introduce new sets of entities and of predicates. We will
thus refer to a description d  (E;F; d), dened for the formal entities and
predicates, E and F , as a model.
When dealing with a model d =(E;F; d), the sets E or F denote the ab-
stract notation in the economists model. They can therefore consist of any
mathematical symbols, though, naturally, economists tend to use mnemonic
notation that suggest certain interpretations. For example, the set of alter-
natives that a decision maker can choose might be referred to as a strategy
setand a typical element thereof as s.
Example 1 (The Dictator Game) We use the dictator game as a run-
ning example. Our description of this game would have the set of entities
E = fP1; P2; 100; :::; 0; (100; 0) ; :::; (0; 100)g
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and the set of predicates
F = fPlayer; Strategy;Outcome;Result; %;Mayg :
The single-place predicate Player is designed to convey the information
that an entity is (or is not) a player. A description d1 = (E;F; d1) will satisfy
d1 (P1; P layer) = 1
d1(P2; P layer) = 1
and, for any other e 2 E, d1(e; P layer) = 0, indicating that it is meaningful
to ask whether such entities are players, but that they are not. For any
e 2 Ek with k > 1, we have d1(e; P layer) = , indicating that it is not
meaningful to ask whether a pair or triple (or so on) of entities is a player.
The possible choices available to P1 are given by the two-place predicate
Strategy:
d1 (P1; 100; Strategy) = 1
...
d1 (P1; 0; Strategy) = 1
while d1 (P2; e; Strategy) = 0 for all e 2 E indicates that P2 is a dummy
player in the game. Next we dene preferences, as in
d1 ((P1; (100; 0) ; (99; 1)) ;%) = 1
d1 ((P1; (99; 1) ; (100; 0)) ;%) = 0
indicating that P1 strictly prefers the allocation (100; 0) to (99; 1). Similar
statements for any other pair of outcomes indicate that P1 always prefers
the split that gives him more. Explicitly,
d1 (P1; (n; 100  n) ; (m; 100 m));%) = 1 if n  m
d1 (P1; (n; 100  n) ; (m; 100 m));%) = 0 if n < m
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We have d1(P1;%) =  = d1(P1; (99; 1);%), indicating that it is meaningless
to ask how the preference relation % ranks P1, and that it is meaningless to
ask whether a player prefers an outcome without asking to what it is to be
compared.
Similarly, Outcome is a 1-place predicate indicating which entities are
outcomes, and Result is a 2-place predicate indicating, for every player-1
strategy and outcome, whether the outcome is the result of the strategy. For
the moment we let d1(e;May) =  for all e, indicating that d1 says nothing
about the predicate May; which is meant to capture the predictions of the
model. We refer to this description as d1.
Example 2 (The Dictator Game, Continued) The description d1 makes
no statement as to the outcome of the game. This would be appropriate if
the goal of the description is simply to present the game. We consider here
a description d2 = (E;F; d2) that comments on outcomes.
Outcomes are described by the predicateMay. For example, an assertion
that the dictator will split the surplus evenly would have
d2((50; 50);May) = 1;
with d2(e;May) = 0 for all other outcomes e (that is, all other e with d1(e; Outcome) =
1): Similarly, a description can let May have the value 1 for more than one
outcome, indicating that more than one outcome is possible. This will be
useful for solution concepts that do not choose a unique outcome, includ-
ing those that are simply agnostic about some outcomes. Observe that the
description d2 is compatible with d1 and it is an extension of d1.
Example 3 (The Dictator Game, Continued) There are many other ex-
tensions of d1. For example, an assertion that the dictator will keep all the
surplus would have
d3((100; 0);May) = 1;
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with d3(e;May) = 0 for other outcomes e. This gives rise to a description d3
that is compatible with and extends d1, but is neither compatible with nor
extends d2.
2.3 Descriptions of Reality
Typically, a scientic paper will not formally describe reality as separate from
its model indeed, the model is often taken to be the formal description of
reality. However, since our goal here is to model the act of modeling, we need
to treat the reality that the economist considers as a formal object separate
from the model that she constructs. To this end, we introduce new notation
for the sets for the entities and predicates used in descriptions of real world
problems.
Assume, then, a set of entitiesER that are supposed to capture the objects
in the real worldbeing modeled. For example, analyzing an international
crisis, the US and Russia might be such entities. While the economist will
refer to these countries informally, say, in the introduction of her paper, we
will use formal elements, US and Russia, as members of the set ER. More
generally, entities in ER could be thought of as objects that are referred to
in a daily newspaper. To avoid confusion, we will assume that real objects
are distinct from formal ones, that is, that E \ ER = ?.
Reality is described by a set of predicates, FR (where, as in the case of the
formal language, we assume FR\ER = ?). To avoid confusion we also use a
di¤erent set of predicates for reality and for the model: F \FR = ?.7 There
might be cases in which one would be tempted to use the same predicate in
describing both the real world and its model. For example, if we wish to state
the fact that the unemployment rate has increased, the term increase is
a natural choice both the description of reality and in the model. However,
there are cases where the mapping between real and formal predicates is
7To be precise, we assume that (E [ ER) \ (F [ FR) = ?, so that the four sets are
pairwise disjoint.
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far from clear. For example, when modeling a political science problem as a
game, it is not always obvious who the players are: countries or their leaders?
Similarly, in many decision problems one has a choice regarding the denition
of an outcome: a (nal) outcome in one model may be an act with uncertain
results in another. We therefore assume that the sets of predicates F and
FR are disjoint.
Given a set of entities ER and predicates FR, facts that are known about
reality will be modeled by a description dR = (ER; FR; dR). We refer to dR
as a description of reality.
Example 4 (The Dictator Game, Continued) A description of a real
dictator game would refer to specic people who interact in the game, perhaps
in a laboratory experiment. The set of entities could be
ER = fMary; John; $100; :::; $0; ($100; $0) ; :::; ($0; $100)g ;
with the set of predicates
FR = fParticipant;Keeps; Allocation;ResultR; P refers; Possible_Outcomeg :
The sets of entities and of predicates are clearly in 1-1 correspondence with
the respective sets in the formal model. The reality in the laboratory experi-
ment is that Mary and John are the participants, that Mary can choose how
many dollars to keep, and so forth. Note that, as the word resultsseems
to be natural both in reality and in the formal model, we use a predicate
ResultR 2 FR which is formally distinct from Result2 F .
2.4 Abstractions and Interpretations
We now turn to the relationship between reality and the model. The econo-
mists conceptualization of the problem is viewed as including
(i) a description of reality, dR = (ER; FR; dR);
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(ii) a model d = (E;F; d);
(iii) a pair of functions (E; F ) such that:
E : ER ! E is a bijection;
F : FR ! F is a bijection;
 for every fR 2 FR, the degree of f = (fR) (according to d) is the
same as the degree of fR (according to dR);







or equivalently, for every eR 2 ER and fR 2 FR, we have d (E(eR); F (fR)) =
dR (eR; fR).
The pair of bijections F ; E will be jointly referred to as , dened as the
union of the ordered pairs in F and in E. The function  can be thought of
as an abstraction of reality, where it takes real-life objects (such as USA)
and thinks of them as formal objects in a model (Player1).
Formally, we dene an abstraction to include both the domain and the
range of these functions. Thus, an abstraction is a triple
A = (dR = (ER; FR; dR);d = (E;F; d);  = E [ F ) :
A common view of science suggests that there is a phenomenon of interest
in reality, which is modeled by the scientist. Thus, one starts with a descrip-
tion of reality dR, and looks for an appropriate abstraction A = (dR;d; ) to
describe it formally. The practice in economic theory is sometimes reversed:
it is not uncommon for an economist to come up with a model, and to have
his peers suggest to him that the formal model has better real-life exam-
ples than those he has started out with. In this case, the model d is the
starting point, and one looks for a description of reality dR that can serve as
an example of the model. Hence we can refer to  1 as the interpretation of
the (formal) model.
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Example 5 (The Dictator Game, Continued) We begin with the model
d1 constructed in Example 1 and the sets of entities and predicates (ER; FR)
from Example 4. We extend these building blocks to an abstraction by spec-
ifying dR and .
The function  = E [ F connects predicates in the obvious way:
F (Participant) = Player
F (Keeps) = Strategy
F (Allocation) = Outcome
F (Prefers) = %
F (Possible_Outcome) = May:
The entities might be usefully connected in more than one way. If we assume




E($100; $0) = (100; 0)
...
E($0; $100) = (0; 100):
We would then ensure that dR(eR; fR) = d(E(eR); F (fR)), and thence that
we have an abstraction, by specifying
dR(Mary; Participant) = 1
dR(John; Participant) = 1
dR(Mary; ($100; $0); ($99; $1); prefers) = 1;
and so on.
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As is always the case, there are many ways to construct a model designed
to examine a particular situation or answer a particular question. For exam-
ple, the analyst might exclude the receiver from the analysis. John would
then be deleted from the set of entities ER in the description of reality and
P2 would be deleted from the set of entities E in the formal model. It is also
not obvious that people care only about their own monetary payo¤s, and
hence Marys preferences (in the description of reality) and P1s preferences
(in the model) might be some other ordering over the 101 outcomes. Hence,
the analyst must choose from many possible descriptions of reality, and many
matching models.
Importantly, not all bijections  yield reasonable models. There are map-
pings that would be contrary to common sense. For example, a real-life entity
such as a stateor a leadermay be mapped to a theoretical entity named
Player1. But an inanimate object such as moneymight not, in most
reasonable models.8
We will assume that a set of acceptable abstractions is exogenously given.
For a given description of reality, dR = (ER; FR; dR), denoting a phenomenon
of interest, a bijection  = E [ F maps (ER; FR) onto sets (E;F ), gener-
ating the abstraction A = (dR;d; ). We will denote the set of acceptable
abstractions for dR by A (dR).
2.5 Theories
2.5.1 Extending Descriptions
We dene a theory as a mapping between models that guarantees extension.
To make this precise, let D(E;F ) be the set of descriptions d = (E;F; d)
with sets of entities and predicates (E;F ). Then a theory is a function
T : D(E;F ) ! D(E;F ) such that, for all d 2 D(E;F ) we have T (d) B d.
Thus, a theory takes an existing model and adds to it information about
8There are exceptions to this rule. For example, electric current may be modeled as a
congestion game, where an electron is mapped to a player.
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various predicates. As a descriptive theory, T should be viewed as saying If
d is the case, then T (d) will also be true. One can think of d as the question,
or the prediction problem, and of T (d) as the answer, or the solution to the
problem.
Observe that the notion of an extension allows for the possibility that
T (d) = d, suggesting that the theory adds nothing to d, or is silent about it.
This might be the case if the theory is simply irrelevant for the description d,
if d is already fully specied (has no  values), or if the description d contains
information that refutes the theory, thereby rendering its predictions dubious.
Note that the domain of the theory consists only of models (E;F; d) in
D(E;F ) and not descriptions of reality, (ER; FR; dR). Thus, we do not allow
theories to make direct reference to proper names in the world. A theory can
reect a statement If Player 1..., then ...but not If Mary..., then ....
While our main interest is in the question of prediction, theories in our
model of economic modeling can also be normative, that is, to provide recom-
mendations. When a theory T is interpreted normatively, it can be viewed
as saying, In case one (a person, a society, etc.) is faced with d, then
one should do what is specied in T (d).This alternative interpretation is
allowed at no additional cost, and will be used in Section 4.9
Example 6 (The Dictator Game, Continued) Suppose we are interested
in the theory T specifying that players in the dictator game choose the ac-
tions corresponding to a subgame perfect equilibrium, or equivalently, that
the dictator chooses a utility-maximizing action. We will then have
T (d1) = d3:
The model d1 species preferences but says nothing about behavior, and
the theory T extends this description by specifying that the dictator will
9Note that the way we refer to a theoryhere might be closer to an everyday usage
of the term paradigm in economics (though not precisely identical to Kuhns (1962)
original usage) or to conceptual framework(Gilboa and Schmeidler, 2001).
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choose her most preferred allocation. By contrast, the model d2, specied
in Example 2, indicates that the dictator splits the surplus evenly, while
maintaining the description of preferences given by d1 (Example 1), and
hence is inconsistent with the theory T . We would then have
T (d2) = d2:
We will also have
T (d3) = d3
because the description d3 (Example 3) already describes the utility maxi-
mizing strategy of P1, and theory T cannot add any information to it.
2.5.2 Rules
Our model of modeling describes theories in a concrete, extensional manner.
For example, our model would describe Nash equilibrium theory by spelling
out its predictions in a specic game. Should it be applied to all games,
one would need to specify its prediction in each and every game. This is
clearly an ine¢ cient way of characterizing theories. In addition, extensional
descriptions of theories do not allow us to distinguish between equivalent
descriptions of the same theory.
It will often be useful to describe theories by a set of rules. A rule r
species an antecedent criterion that a description may (or may not) satisfy,
and identies an extension of those descriptions that satisfy the antecedent.
Hence, a rule r gives rise to a function (also denoted by r) that associates with
any description (E;F; d) an extension r(E;F; d) = (E;F; d0) B (E;F;D). If
a description (E;F; d) fails the antecedent of the rule r, then r(E;F; d) =
(E;F; e).
Example 7 (Backward Induction) Consider descriptions d = (E;F; d)
that capture nite extensive form games with perfect information and no ties.
The Backward Induction solution can be viewed as a theory T that provides
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a unique prediction for each such game. Clearly, its domain is innite. Yet,
it can be succinctly described by a simple rule. Consider a 2-place predicate,
Predicted, applying to a node n in the extensive form of the game and an
outcome, z, and interpreted as stating that all players predict that, should the
node n be reached, the game will evolve to outcome z. With this predicate
we can state a rule that says that, if (a description d implies that) at node n,
belonging to player i, each successor of n is predicted (according to Predicted)
to have a particular outcome, then it is predicted (according to Predicted)
that is play at n will select the successor whose predicted outcome maximizes





assigns Predicted values to the nodes before the leaves. Applying this rule
inductively generates a description d0 that augments the description of the
game d to have Predicted values for all nodes, including the root of the tree,
and this prediction will be the Backward Induction solution.
As the Backward Induction example illustrates, when we dene a theory
by rules, we use them as soon as their antecedents hold, irrespective of the
compatibility of the theory with these antecedents. For example, the rule of
the backward induction prediction is used in every node of the game tree,
including those nodes that will eventually be ruled out by the backward
induction theory.
2.6 Using Models and Theories to Examine Reality
Suppose we have a description of reality (ER; FR; dR), from which we would
like to draw some conclusions. For example, the description may identify a
person, a set of feasible alternatives, and preferences, and our task may be to
characterize the persons behavior. Alternatively, the description may specify
a game, and our task may be to apply an appropriate notion of equilibrium
behavior.
We draw such conclusions as the joint product of an abstraction and a
theory. More concretely, we use a description of reality dR = (ER; FR; dR),
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Description of Reality Formal Description
Input; or question (ER; FR; dR)
; from abstraction A            ! (E;F; d)
# theory; T
Output; or answer (ER; FR; d
0
R)
 1; interpretation              (E;F; d0)
:
Figure 1: An illustration of how a model and a theory are used to draw
conclusions about reality. The point of departure is a description of reality
dR = (ER; FR; dR). The function  associated with the abstraction A as-
sociates a formal description (E;F; d) with this description of reality, with
dR and d related via d(e; f) = dR( 1(e);  1(f)). The theory T then ex-
tends the formal description (E;F; d) to a description (E;F; d0). We can
then again use the interpretation  1 to nd an associated description of
reality (ER; FR; d0R), satisfying d
0
R(eR; fR) = d
0((eR); (fR)). We refer to
d0R = (ER; FR; d
0
R) as the A T extension of (ER; FR; d).
an abstraction A 2 A (dR), and a theory T to proceed as follows:
1. Recall that the abstraction A = ((ER; FR; dR); (E;F; d); ) denes a
model (E;F; d), satisfying d(e; f) = dR( 1(e);  1(f)).
2. The theory T then gives a model (E;F; d0) that extends (E;F; d).
3. The inverse of the abstraction, namely the interpretation of the model,




Figure 1 illustrates this process. It is a straightforward calculation to
verify that d0R is indeed an extension of dR. We refer to (ER; FR; d
0
R) as the
A-T -extension of (ER; FR; dR).
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3 Testing and Applying Theories
3.1 The Question
Suppose that we have a description of reality dR = (ER; FR; dR). We have
seen that it can be extended by analysis, involving an abstraction A and a
theory T . We wish to compare this extension with extensions that are not
the result of analysis.
What other sources of extensions are there? The simplest one is the
accumulation of data. New observations are added to the description of
reality, extending dR to some d̂R. In this case the question we would be
interested in would be, are the new observations in line with the theorys
predictions, or do they refute the theory? Does the theory predict precisely
these observations, or can it at least be reconciled with them?
Alternatively, the extension d̂R may reect normative considerations, in-
tuition or introspection, ethical principles or ideology. In this case the ques-
tion would be, can these non-theoretical inputs be reconciled with the theory?
Or is it perhaps the case that the theory can even inform intuition by point-
ing out the correctextension d̂R? In the next subsections we dene these
notions more formally.
Example 8 (The Dictator Game, Continued) Suppose someone proposed
running an experiment to testtheory T described in Example 6, specify-
ing that players in the dictator game choose the actions corresponding to
a subgame perfect equilibrium, or equivalently, that the dictator chooses a
utility-maximizing action. Let us consider an abstraction A with  mapping
the experiment into description d1 and then apply theory T . As pointed out
in that example, T (d1) = d3. Suppose that in the experiment the dictators
systematically choose splits that do not give them all the money. We can
deduce from this that there is some problem in our construction, but we
cannot necessarily deduce that theory T is wrong. We might argue instead
that the abstraction A is the problem: the subjectspreferences were not such
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that P1 prefers (100,0) to any split that gives a positive amount to P2.
Example 9 (The Ultimatum Game) Consider the UltimatumGame with
two players, P1 and P2 in which P1 proposes a split of 100 to P2. If P2
agrees the split will be implemented; if not both players get 0: Suppose
someone proposed running an experiment to test theory T . Consider an
abstraction A with  mapping the experiment into a description similar to
d1, but with the strategies acc (accept) and rej (reject) added as strategies
for P2, and preferences for P2 analogous to those for P1 (outcomes in which
she gets more money are always preferred to outcomes in which she gets less).
Applying theory T to this description, we get the analog of the result in the
Dictator Game: P1 proposes the split (100,0) and P2 accepts the split. Sup-
pose that in the experiments we often see subjects in the role of P2 rejecting
proposed splits of (99; 1), and the description of reality dR = (ER; FR; dR)
is extended to incorporate this data. As in the previous example we can
conclude that there is some problem in our construction, but we should not
conclude that the theory (that players choose actions corresponding to a
subgame perfect equilibrium) is wrong. As in that example, the problem
probably lies in the playerspreferences posited in the abstraction.
3.2 Abstraction-Dependent Denitions
We next formalize some of the ideas implicit in the previous two examples.
We begin with an abstraction A, consisting of the description of reality dR =
(ER; FR; dR), a model d = (E;F; d) and a function . We combine this
abstraction with a theory T . Together, these dene the A-T -extension of
(ER; FR; dR), which is a description
d0R = (ER; FR; d
0
R);
satisfying d0R(eR; fR) = d
0((eR); (fR)).
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Description of Reality Formal Description
Input; or question (ER; FR; dR)
; from abstraction A            ! (E;F; d)
# # theory; T
(ER; FR; d̂R)
Output; or answer (ER; FR; d
0
R)
 1; interpretation              (E;F; d0)
:
Figure 2: Illustration of how data, normative considerations, or other consid-
erations are used to evaluate a theory. The point of departure is a descrip-
tion of reality (ER; FR; dR). A process of data collection, experimentation,
introspection, intuition, or so on extends this description to the description
(ER; FR; d̂R). As before, the function , which is part of the abstraction
A, associates a formal description (E;F; d) with this description of reality.
The theory T then extends the formal description (E;F; d) to a description
(E;F; d0) and the interpretation  1 is then used to obtain the A T exten-
sion of (ER; FR; d). We then say that the theory T is A-compatible with d̂R
if the the A-T -extensions d0R and d̂R are compatible descriptions, and the
theory T A-necessitates d̂R if the the A-T -extension d0R is an extension of
d̂R.
Our task is now to compare d0R with another extension of dR, d̂R. We con-
sider two possibilities for this comparison. The rst will be used to determine
when a (descriptive) theory T is refuted by the data, or when a (normative)
theory T cannot justify a decision. The second will be useful to indicate
when a theory implies a certain conclusion (prediction or recommendation).
Denition 1 Given an abstraction A = (dR = (ER; FR; dR);d = (E;F; d); )
and an extension d̂R of dR, we say that:
[1.1] A theory T is A-compatible with d̂R if the A-T -extension d0R and d̂R
are compatible descriptions.
[1.2] A theory T A-necessitates d̂R if the A-T -extension d0R is an exten-
sion of d̂R.
Figure 2 illustrates these denitions. When the extension d̂R is obtained from
dR by adding a single specication of the form d̂R(e; f) = x 2 f0; 1g, we say
that theory T A-necessitates (e; f; x) (as well as that theory T A-necessitates
22
d̂R).
Example 8 described a case in which the abstraction A associated dR,
the dictator game experiment, with d3, the model in which player 10s pref-
erences are specied as preferring outcomes that gave him more money. The
theory T that players actionsare consistent with subgame perfect equilib-
rium yielded the extension in which player 2 received 0 in the outcome. The
A-T extension d0R is not compatible with d̂R; in the extension of the ex-
periment to include the experimental results subjects in the role of player 1
systematically gave positive amounts to their partners whereas d0R prescribed
that this not happen.
If one employed the abstraction A0 that associated dR with d1, that left
preferences for player 1 over outcomes unspecied, the A0-T -extension would
have made no predictionabout outcomes, and hence the theory T would
have been A0 compatible. The theory T would not, however A0-necessitate
d̂R.
Example 10 (The Sunk Cost Fallacy) The classical sunk cost fallacy is
illustrated by someone who has paid $50 for a ticket to a concert but forgets
to take the ticket to the concert. Only when arriving at the concert does he
realize his mistake. He can buy a replacement ticket for $50 but chooses not
to pay twiceto hear the concert. An economists conventional response to
this decision is to label it as misguided, since at the time the concert-goer
chooses whether to buy a replacement ticket the cost of the initial ticket
has been sunk. The economists argument can be thought of as beginning
with a description of reality, dR and then extending the description to d̂R,
in which the agent chooses not to buy the replacement ticket (the extension
based on the agents observed behavior). The economist then analyzes the
following abstraction A of the problem. The agent prefers ( 50; Y es) to
(0; No), where the rst entry represents the cost of the ticket and the second
represents whether he has a ticket or not. The economist then considers an
extension d of the abstraction that reects the theory T that agents play in
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accordance with subgame perfection, that is that the agent chooses the most
preferred outcome. This extension, of course, has the agent purchasing the
replacement ticket. Thus the A-T -extension d0R is incompatible with d̂R.
This example bears some similarity with Examples 8 and 9 above in that
one can understand the A-T extension of the description of reality, dR, to
be the result of an incorrect choice of the abstraction associating dR to
a model d. A plausible interpretation of the incompatibility of the A-T
extension and the extension d̂R that encompasses the empirical observations
is that the playerspreferences in the abstraction were incorrect.
However, one might argue that this example di¤ers in a substantive way
from Examples 8 and 9. An economist observing the incompatibilities in
Examples 8 and 9 might conclude that the incompatibility most likely arose
because of the preferences associated with the abstractions. In the sunk cost
fallacy problem, however, the economist might think that the problem was
not necessarily in the preferences embodied in the abstraction, but rather
in the theory T . The economist might argue that the abstraction captures
the agents preference accurately, but the agent is making a mistake in his
choice. Indeed, the problem is called the sunk cost fallacy to emphasize that
the agent is making a mistake. In Examples 8 and 9 the economist might
rethink his analysis of the dictator and ultimatum games, but decide in the
sunk cost fallacy game that he should spend his time educating the decision
maker.
We are not arguing that the sunk cost fallacy necessarily implies that
the problem lies in the theory T . The agent who forgot the ticket and chose
not to buy a replacement might resist the economists characterization of this
decision as a fallacy as follows: I didnt buy the replacement ticket because I
wouldnt have enjoyed the concert. I would have kept thinking that forgetting
to bring the ticket was stupid, so I decided to spend the evening at a bookstore
rather than go to the concert.If one takes this argument at face value, the
incompatibility does not lie in the theory T , but as in Examples 8 and 9,
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it lies in the abstraction to a model that with a description of preferences
less nuanced than appropriate. The economist may or may not be able to
convince the decision maker that such preferences are confusedand should
be modied.
We emphasize that, whether most economists would cling to the backward
induction solution in Examples 8 and 9 but not in 10 is an empirical question.
In this paper do not purport do predict how economists would react to these
challenges, just as we do not attempt to predict what people would do in
these games. Our only goal is to provide a model in which these discussions
can be conducted.
3.3 Abstraction-Independent Denitions
It is clear from Section 3.2 that in the absence of a specic abstraction A,
one cannot ask whether a theory is or is not compatible with observed data,
nor whether it necessitates certain conclusions. It might do so for some
abstractions but not for others. Can we formulate counterparts of these
ideas that are not dependent on specic abstractions?
Three possibilities arise:
(i) Using a strong notion in which a concept applies for all acceptable
abstractions;
(ii) Using a weak notion in which a concept applies for at least one ac-
ceptable abstraction;
(iii) Suggesting some aggregation over abstractions, weighing the set of
abstractions for which the concept applies vis-a-vis the set for which it does
not.
We consider the rst two possibilities in this section.
Denition 2 Given a description of reality dR = (ER; FR; dR) and an ex-
tension d̂R of dR, we say that:
[2.1] A theory T is strongly compatible with d̂R if for every acceptable
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abstraction A = ((ER; FR; dR); (E;F; d); ) 2 A (dR), the A-T -extension d0R
and d̂R are compatible descriptions.
[2.2] A theory T is weakly compatible with d̂R if there exists an acceptable
abstraction A = ((ER; FR; dR); (E;F; d); ) 2 A (dR), such that the A-T -
extension d0R and d̂R are compatible descriptions.
[2.3] A theory T strongly necessitates d̂R if for every acceptable abstrac-
tion A = ((ER; FR; dR); (E;F; d); ) 2 A (dR), the A-T -extension d0R neces-
sitates d̂R.
[2.4] A theory T weakly necessitates d̂R if there exists an acceptable ab-
straction A = ((ER; FR; dR); (E;F; d); ) 2 A (dR), such that the A-T -extension
d0R necessitates d̂R.
Theories that say little can be compatible with many descriptions. Clearly,
a more general theory, that is, one that extends more descriptions and/or ex-
tends them further, is more easily refutable. In the following, we focus on the
questions of necessitation, asking whether a theory can weakly or strongly
necessitate a given extension. Similar questions can be posed for compatibil-
ity.
3.4 Analogies: Aggregation of Models
Rather than seeking results that hold for at least one acceptable model, or
results that hold for all models, we might look for ways to aggregate mod-
els. We have pursued this approach in Gilboa, Postlewaite, Samuelson, and
Schmeidler [10]. In that paper we argue that economic reasoning is often
case-based. Moreover, economic models may be viewed as theoretical cases.
According to this view, each model is only a source of analogy that sug-
gests possible predictions. A practitioner called upon to answer an economic
question or to make a prediction may use various theoretical models, as well
as empirical and experimental evidence, intuition and thought experiments,
historical studies, and other sources of inspiration. The practitioner aggre-
gates the caseswith the help of a similarity function, e¤ectively taking a
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weighted average of their predictions to generate a prediction in the current
problem.
We could extend the current model to capture such case-based reasoning.
Toward this end, a theoretical caseis a model, analyzed by a theory that
generates an extension thereof. Analogies are given by an abstraction . The
aggregation of many cases would correspond to aggregation of abstractions.
3.5 Complexity Results
3.5.1 Interpretations of a theory
Our model of economic modeling begins with a description of reality dR and
exploits an abstraction to map this dR into a description d. As mentioned
above, however, economic modeling often operates in reverse: the economist
may construct a model not aimed at a specic real world problem, but rather
at a phenomenon that might be found in a number of real world problems.
Spences (1973,1974) signalling model is an exemplar. In its simplest form
the model considers an agent who has either high or low ability. Firms value
an agents ability, but ability is unobservable. The agent can, however, make
an observable investment in an attribute, and the (unobservable) investment
cost to the agent is inversely correlated with her ability. The attribute in
which the agent invests is in itself of no value to the rm, but the agents
investment level is observable. Now, if the agent is of high ability, she can
signal her ability by making a su¢ ciently large investment; had she been of
low ability her (assumed) higher cost of investment would have deterred her
from making that investment.
Spence motivated his model with a very simple story of workers investing
in education, with the assumption that higher ability workers had lower costs
of acquiring any given level of education. The model was not meant to be a
serious model of human capital investment, as it ignored the kind of school the
agent went to, her choice of topics, reasons other than subsequent wages she
might have chosen to go to school, and so on. Rather, the model was meant to
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demonstrate how nonpayo¤-relevant choices the investments might serve
in equilibrium as signals about unobservable payo¤-relevant characteristics.
Beginning with the signalling model, economists interpret the model with
a description of reality dR. For example, the model might have an interpre-
tation that suggests how a company chooses whether to pay dividends today.
The agent in the model could be mapped into the company, which has private
information about whether prots tomorrow will be high or low. The rm in
the model could be mapped into an investor who might purchase stock in the
company. With this mapping, the company in the real world might signal
that prots tomorrow will be high by paying a dividend today, where paying
a dividend today is more costly to the company if its prots tomorrow are
going to be low.
Spences signalling model has proven useful in a vast array of economic
problems because it admits many di¤erent interpretations. Firms can o¤er
warranties to signal the quality of goods sold, entrepreneurs can signal the
quality of a proposed enterprise by taking a large equity interest in the en-
terprise, a suitor can signal his long term interest by signing a prenuptial
agreement that triggers a generous payment upon divorce, the suitee can
signal her long term interest by tearing up a proposed prenuptial agreement
from the suitor, and so on. The diversity of the interpretations of the sig-
nalling model is possible because of the simplicity of the basic model. Had
one been interested in a model of educational investment choice, it would have
been useful to extend the model to include some of the neglected consider-
ations mentioned above. Adding these considerations to the model would
undoubtedly have made the model more useful for understanding education
choices. However, including more details in the model makes it more complex
and necessarily decreases the interpretations of the model. For example, if
the model had included the various reasons an agent might invest in educa-
tion, there might not be an interpretation that describes the dividend policy
question.
28
3.5.2 Determining the compatibility of a theory
Making a theory more accurate by adding more details not only decreases the
number of interesting interpretations, it makes determining the compatibility
of the theory with a description of reality dR more di¢ cult. As the number of
elements of a theory increases the number of possible abstractions increases
exponentially. Consequently, identifying whether the theory is strongly or
weakly compatible with data and whether the theory strongly or weakly
necessitates a conclusion can be expected to get ever more di¢ cult as the
theory becomes more complex. We turn next to a formal analysis of how
much more di¢ cult is that task.
Recall that we only deal with acceptable abstractions A 2 A (dR), where
the set A (dR) is assumed to be exogenously given. We further assume that
acceptability places restrictions only on the mapping between predicates.
This corresponds to an intuitive notion of universality: if, for example, a
theory makes claims about players in a game, and we have established which
real-life entities might be modeled as players, it seems natural that each such
real-life entity can be mapped to each player in the game. In particular, we
rule out cases in which it is acceptable to model, say, the US as Player 1 but
not as Player 2.
This condition might appear restrictive in the following sense: suppose
that a theorist wishes to model one state as a single player, but another state
as a collection of players. This might appear reasonable, if, for example, the
former is a dictatorship and the latter is a democratic country with various
institutions. However, in this case there would be predicates that distinguish
the two countries. Thus, we nd it natural that acceptable abstractions will
be dened by mappings between predicates, allowing for all the bijections
between entities. Intuitively, entities are devoid of any content, and anything
we know about them is reected in the predicates they satisfy.
For any description of reality dR = (ER; FE; dR), there will thus be many
acceptable abstractions. Even if there is only one obvious way to map pred-
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icates into one another, as in our example of the dictator game, there will
be many ways to map entities into one another, and the number of such
ways grows rapidly as does the number of entities. This is the source of our
complexity results:
Proposition 1 Consider a description of reality dR = (ER; FR; dR), a pair
(e; f) 2 ER  FR such that dR (e; f) = , a value x 2 f0; 1g, and a set of
acceptable abstractions A (dR). Then it is NP-Hard to determine whether a
theory T weakly necessitates (e; f; x).
Next we show that a similar conclusion applies to strong necessitation.
Proposition 2 Consider a description of reality dR = (ER; FR; dR), a pair
(e; f) 2 ER  FR such that dR (e; f) = , a value x 2 f0; 1g, and a set of
acceptable abstractions A (dR). Then it is NP-Hard to determine whether a
theory T strongly necessitates (e; f; x).
Making use of theories in a computationally simple way will thus require ei-
ther that we restrict attention to models with relatively small sets of entities,
or that we nd some additional structure that can limit the set of acceptable
abstractions.
4 Applications
4.1 The Role of Economics
To rephrase the distinction between prediction and critique suggested in the
Introduction in the language of our model of modeling, observe that the
classical view of science would leave no room for intuition. A description of
reality, dR, is given, it is modeled by an abstraction A about which there is
little room for debate, economic theory T is applied to generate predictions
and recommendations, and these are mapped back into reality. The corre-
sponding predictions and recommendations are strongly necessitated by T ,
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either because there is but one abstraction A 2 A (dR), or because the vari-
ous abstractions are not so di¤erent from each other and end up converging
on their predictions and recommendations.10
By contrast, it is possible that the theory can be applied in a variety of
ways, and that no non-trivial extension of dR is strongly necessitated by T .
In this case, politicians and journalists might still come up with predictions
and policy proposals. The economist can then check, post-hoc, whether
these are consistent with economic lore, that is, whether they are weakly
necessitated by T . A positive answer does not amount to a support of the
proposed policy or prediction, as it merely veries its consistency with the
economic principles embodied in T . However, a negative answer is a cause
for concern: if the prediction or recommendation is not weakly necessitated
by T , and there is no acceptable abstraction A 2 A (dR) that supports it,
one may well wonder whether these are reasonable guidelines to follow.
4.2 Is Economic Theory Vacuous?
Allowing ourselves a casual observation, it appears that over the past several
decades there has been a shift in microeconomic theory from general equilib-
rium models to game theoretic models. This change has been accompanied
by a greater freedom in selecting an abstraction . For example, a goodin
general equilibrium theory may be a concrete product, as well as an Arrow
security, but the concept cannot easily accommodate social and psycholog-
ical phenomena. By contrast, an outcome in a game is a more exible
notion. Similarly, concepts such as player, strategy, and state of the
worldsuggest a rich set of acceptable abstractions A (dR). As we have seen
above, this freedom may render the theory vacuous. An example such as the
10In particular, we can have a very large number of acceptable abstractions that yield
the same results for reasons of symmetry. For example, if a large number of identical
objects in reality are mapped onto an equally large number of identical entities in the
model, the number of possible mappings is exponentially large, but, due to symmetry, one
of them is enough for the analysis.
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dictator game may refute a particular assumption about the determinants
of playersutility, but it cannot shake the foundations of decision or game
theory.
It seems that some of the discussions about the refutability of economics
and its status as a science, as well as some of debates revolving around be-
havioral economics have to do with the distinction between weak and strong
compatibility (or necessitation). Detractors of the eld point to phenomena
where some acceptable abstractions are not compatible with the data. Some
responses have been along the Popperian lines (Popper, 1934), attempting to
redene the scope of the theory. For example, it has often been argued that
peoples behavior in ultimatum or dictator games would conform to standard
theory if the stakes were high enough. This is reminiscent of the restriction of
Newtonian physics to certain levels of energy. However, another response to
the experimental challenge has been the re-denition of terms as indicated
above. This is a switch from strong compatibility to weak compatibility,
which is more frequent in economics than in, say, physics.11
This discussion suggests that decision and game theory should be viewed
as conceptual frameworks rather than as specic theories. As a rough approx-
imation, one can view theories as refuted as soon as one of the appropriate
abstractions in A (dR) is at odds with observations. By contrast, a concep-
tual framework is rejected only when all such abstractions are contradicted
by evidence. Stated di¤erently, we expect theories to be strongly compatible
with the data, whereas conceptual frameworks need only be weakly compat-
ible with the data.
This approach raises the question of refutability: are the foundations of
11At the same time, re-denition of terms is by no means restricted to economics or to
its foundations. For example, one may view part of Freuds contribution as changing the
unit of analysis, having goals and beliefs, from a unied self to ego, id, and super-ego.
Similarly, in defending evolutionary reasoning one often needs to explain that the unit
of analysis is not the organism but the gene. In both cases, as in the rational choice
paradigm, a theorymay appear to be refuted given one abstraction  but not given
others.
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modern economic theory tautologically true? Can one imagine any set of
observations that would not be compatible with decision and game theory?
The answer depends, of course, on what is considered acceptable, that
is, on the choice of the appropriate set of abstractions A (dR), which is taken
to be exogenous in this paper. It is common sense that has to determine the
scope ofA (dR). We believe that our model partly captures a phrase by Amos
Tversky: Theories are not refuted; they are embarrassed.Indeed, decision
theory can typically be shown to be weakly compatible with the data, and
the question isnt whether it has been refuted, but rather, whether the set of
mappings A (dR) hasnt become embarrassingly large or counter-intuitive.
4.3 Objective and Subjective Rationality
One view of rationality relates the concept of a rational decision to the ro-
bustness of the decision, reected in the ability to convince others that the
decision is reasonable. Specically, it is suggested that decisions can be ra-
tional in two separate but related ways: a decision is objectively rational if
any reasonable personcan be convinced that it is the correct decision. A
decision is subjectively rational for a reasonableperson if she cannot be
convinced that this is a wrong decision for her. In both cases, by convinc-
ingwe refer to reasoning that does not resort to new information; that is,
to the type of reasoning that the decision maker could have come up with on
her own.
The Sunk Cost Fallacy examined in Example 10 illustrates subjective and
objective rationality. The agent who chooses not to buy a replacement ticket
to the concert might alter his choice after taking an economics course that
discusses sunk costs. With the help of an economics course and su¢ cient
discussion, the agents preferences might conform to those in the abstrac-
tion the economist has associated with dR. If we nd the agents counter
argument in the example plausible, we would deem the agent as subjectively
rational. Only if we think that all reasonable people should be convinced
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by the economists argument would we say that an agent who foregoes the
concert is not even subjectively rational.
The concept of objective rationality relates to strong necessitation: in-
dependently of the decision makers hunches and intuition, based on hard
evidence, the theory makes specic recommendations. As these recommen-
dations are valid for every abstraction A 2 A (dR), they should be able to
convince every reasonable person.
By contrast, in subjective rationality the decision maker makes various
choices that need not be supported by a model. Rather, she makes decisions
based on her intuition, and the question becomes: can she be convinced that
she is wrong? If the decision maker can point to at least one abstraction
A 2 A (dR) that justies (necessitates) her choices, she can defend them and
cannot be convinced that she was in the wrong. Thus, subjective rationality
applies to all choices that are weakly necessitated by the theory.
4.4 The Role of Decision-Aid Models
There is a tendency, especially among lay people, to expect decision theo-
retical models to come up with the correct answer. Presumably, decision
theory is supposed to provide mathematical models that, taking into account
the relevant data and perhaps some subjective parameters, will compute cor-
rect predictions given possible outcomes of all available actions, and eventu-
ally nd the best decision. Indeed, this high standard is often attained, in
particular in domains such as statistics or operations research. For example,
theory can help one identify which of two drugs has higher e¢ cacy, or how
to nd a shortest path between two points on a map.
Unfortunately, not all problems can be neatly resolved by theoretical
models. Unknown fundamental mechanisms, high degrees of complexity, and
unavailable data can each hamper a models performance. Decisions involv-
ing human and social factors might encounter all of these di¢ culties, render-
ing theory almost useless in predicting phenomena such as wars and stock
34
market crashes.
The classical model is often encountered in operations research problems
that have a relatively small component of individual input. For example, if
Mary wishes to nd the shortest driving distance between two points, she
may ignore intuition and let theory guide her. Reality would consist of the
map and related information; there will be a relatively tight set of reasonable
abstractions A (dR), and a simple algorithm would be the recommendation
of theory T under each of them. That is, the claim that a certain path is
optimal will be strongly necessitated by T . Mary would do well to follow
that recommendation even if some turns along the path might seem counter-
intuitive to her.
By contrast, if Mary wishes to invest her savings, she may nd that there
are too many ways to model the worlds nancial markets. Mary may adhere
to a theory of optimal portfolio management, T , but, in the absence of a
choice (an extension d00R of dR) that is strongly necessitated by the theory,
she may be at a loss. As a result, she may choose simply to follow her
intuition. However, it would be useful for her to test, post-hoc, whether
there exists a model that justies this choice, that is, whether her choice is
weakly necessitated by T . If it is not, Mary might wonder why, and whether
she can still do better after all.
5 Conclusion
5.1 Other Sciences
The standard view of sciencebrings to mind an academic discipline engag-
ing in the construction of formal models that provide predictions. However,
there are respectable academic disciplines that are considered useful with-
out being scientic in this sense, ranging from mathematics to history and
philosophy.
A general point this paper attempts to make is that domains that are
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considered scientic can also be useful as criticism. Physics provides laws
of preservation that check fanciful ideas such as perpetual motion machines,
while biology makes us doubt physical immortality. In both cases, it is useful
to nd the aw in an argument even if it is not replaced by any quantita-
tive prediction. Similarly, economics often proves useful without necessarily
making predictions.
Beyond this claim, it is worthwhile to ask, is economics viewed as critique
more often than are the natural or life sciences, and if so, why? We believe
that this is indeed the case for two reasons. The rst relates to the nature of
economic questions: dealing with social and political issues, lay people such
as journalists and politicians often o¤er new economic ideas and predictions
more readily than, say, mathematical or physical innovations. The reader
has probably never had a cab driver suggest his or her personal theory of
planetary motion or cold fusion but might have heard any number of such
theories about the 2007 nancial meltdown. Without minimizing the success
of economics as a predictive science, it appears that the context of the debate
makes it more important as a critical eld than are the natural sciences.
The second reason has to do with the nature of economic answers: the
reliance of modern economic analysis on general tools such as decision and
game theory generates a richness of possible interpretations. Thus, there are
more cases in which there is a distinction between predicting (an outcome)
and critiquing (an argument). For elds in which the theoretical terms are
more clearly mapped onto real ones the distinction between the two is less
important, and, indeed, most critiques would also generate predictions.
5.2 Probabilistic Abstractions
It would be interesting to extend the deterministic model that we have set out
to allow probabilistic abstractions. In our examples based on the Dictator
Game, one part of the abstractions dealt with player 1s preferences. The
examples considered two abstractions that entailed di¤erent specications of
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these preferences: one abstraction left the preferences completely open while
another specied that for any two di¤erent outcomes, the player preferred
the outcome that gave him the larger amount of money.
The extension of the real-world description dR to d̂R that incorporated
the results of a Dictator Game experiment was surely compatible with the
abstraction of the model that didnt specify preferences, since in that case
no prediction was made. (That is, the extension of the model given the
theory that the agent always chose the best outcome is the trivial extension.)
Abstractions that specify nontrivial preferences (that is, preferences such that
there exist two outcomes o1 and o2 with o1 strictly preferred to o2) make
possible incompatibility of the A  T extension with d̂R.
The problem, though, is that any such specication is likely to result in
incompatibility if the number of subjects in the experiment is large. If ones
belief is that few subjects who nd themselves in the role of player 1 will give
nothing to player 2, one would not want to specify deterministic preferences
that make this impossible. Rather, one would like an abstraction in which
relatively few, say less than 10%, of the subjects in the player 1 role choose
to take the entire amount of money.
Asking whether more than 10% of the subjects chose (100; 0) is a yes-
or-no question. Replications of the experiment might give rise to di¤erent
extensions of dR and the A T extension in which the abstraction has fewer
than 10% of the agents caring only about their monetary outcome might be
compatible with some extensions of dR and not others. The interpretation
of a statement like The A   T extension of the reality description dR is
incompatible with d̂Rthus becomes more complicated than in our model in
this paper. One would naturally ask how likely it was that the incompatibility
would arise in a replication of the experiment.
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5.3 Multiple Theories
In the discussion above we refer to a single theory that can be compared
to data or to intuition. One may consider several theories that compete in
their attempt to generate predictions or recommendations. However, our
basic model involved no loss of generality: given several distinct theories,
one may consider their union as a grand theory, and relegate the choice
of a theory to the choice of the abstraction A. To this end, it su¢ ces that
the sets of entities to which theories apply be disjoint. Figuratively, it is as
if we guarantee that each scientist has access to her own set of variables,
and we consider the entirety of their research papers as a single theory. This
single theory generates only the extensions that are unions of extensions
suggested by the single (original) theories, so that a practitioner can choose
which theory to use by choosing an abstraction, but cannot derive any new
conclusions from the union of the theories.
5.4 Normative Economics
The social sciences di¤er from the natural sciences, inter alia, in that the
former deal with subjects who can be exposed to and understand the the-
ories developed about them. When focusing on descriptive theories, this
distinction explains economistsfocus on equilibria: nonequilibrium predic-
tions would be self-refuting prophecies, o¤ering the economist a more or less
sure way to be wrong. Moreover, this distinction also gives rise to norma-
tive considerations in the social sciences, considerations that are meaningless
in the natural ones. It seems, however, that there is more than one way
to understand what normative science is. The textbook approach says that
normativerefers to oughtrather than is. But what is this ought?
One possibility is illustrated by the Sunk Cost Fallacy of Example 10.
The agent who chooses not to buy a replacement ticket to the concert might
alter his choice after taking an economics course that discusses sunk costs.
Oughtin this case means that with su¢ cient discussion, the agents pref-
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erences will conform to those in the abstraction the economist has associated
with dR. As we suggested there, the agent may not be convinced by the
economists arguments, but the economists arguments are typically of the
form Rational agents ought to ignore sunk costs.
One does not have to accept the economists normative judgments. As
discussed in Section 4.3, an economists or anyones normative prescrip-
tions are valid only to the extent that others nd the arguments behind the
prescription compelling. We suggested there that the dialog between a theo-
rist and her subject may not result in the subject accepting the economists
argument to ignore sunk costs.
5.5 The Discipline of Economics
Research is a social phenomenon, in which people decide which topics to
study, what to publish and so forth. In studying methodology, one observes
this phenomenon and tries to understand it, thereby engaging in social sci-
ence. Ones interest may have a normative avor typically referred to as
philosophy of scienceor a stronger descriptive bent closer to the soci-
ology of science. Both tendencies can be viewed as belonging to the realm
of social science, broadly construed.
As a descriptive social science, the sociology of economics cannot expect
to have formal, mathematical models that provide perfect descriptions of
reality. As in other social sciences, such as economics itself, one expects
models that are rather imperfect to help in understanding reality. We view
our task in this paper as theoretical: our goal is to o¤er new models that may
enhance understanding of social phenomena, in the case at hand, of formal
modeling in some realms of the social sciences. Empirical work is needed to
test which model best ts observations. Hence, we do not purport to argue
here that our view of economics as critique better explains economic research
than the more classical view of economics as a "Popperian" science. We o¤er
another way to conceive of observations, but we do not claim to have made
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an empirical investigation of the relative success of this conceptualization.
The above notwithstanding, we o¤er here a tentative conjecture that our
model might t some observations better than the classical one. Economic
theory o¤ers many qualitative predictions that are supposed to hold under
ceteris paribus assumptions. These ceteris paribus conditions tend to be very
hard to observe in real life, rendering such predictions dubious from an empir-
ical viewpoint. By contrast, ceteris paribus arguments are valid as criticism:
to challenge a way of reasoning, they are very powerful, even if nothing is
held xed in reality. That is, they can serve for gedankenexperiments when
natural experiments are hard to identify.
This way of looking at economics can be applied to our model as well.
Indeed, our model can be viewed as a form of critique: it criticizes the
demands on economics to make predictions, by pointing out that economists
can be useful without making predictions.
5.6 Economics as Criticism and as Case-Based Rea-
soning
Relative to the view posited by Gilboa, Postlewaite, Samuelson and Schmei-
dler (2014) that economic models are theoretical cases, the view of economics
as critique is even more modest: in the latter, the goal of economic modeling
is only to test whether certain reasoning is valid, without making any pre-
dictions (case-based or rule-based). However, our focus on a single theory T
does seem to attribute greater importance to the theory than the analogical
(case-based) model. This seems to be compatible with the notion of critique:
while it does not need to proactively generate predictions, it aims to be a
more objective standard for testing predictions. To consider an extreme ex-
ample, assume that ones theory consists of no more than logical deductions.
In and of themselves, such deductions make no predictions; specic assump-
tions about the reality modeled would be needed to reach any conclusions.
However, logic enjoys a very high degree of objectivity when it comes to
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testing the validity of arguments.
5.7 Freedom of Modeling in Economics
Most of the examples above suggest that decision and game theory are closer
to being paradigmsor conceptual frameworksthan specic theories, and
that this is much less true of more classical microeconomic theory. While we
do believe this to be the case, it is important to point out that the choice
of a model and re-denition of terms is not restricted to game or decision
theory applications. Consider, for example, basic consumer theory, accord-
ing to which consumers choose a bundle of goods so as to maximize a util-
ity function given a budget constraint, and that they therefore satisfy the
axioms of revealed preferences (WARP, SARP...). Clearly, this theory has
counter-examples in observed data. However, Chiappori (1988,1992) (see also
Browning, Chiappori andWeiss (2014, Chapter 3)) argue that if a households
expenses are split between members of the household specically, between
a wife and a husband then utility maximization may be a much more rea-
sonable hypothesis than if the household is viewed as a single unit. That is,
while the standard approach is to map a specic household to a single con-
sumer, they suggest that individuals within households are to be mapped
to di¤erent consumers. One can easily imagine how similar redenitions of
terms might be important in assessing theories in other elds in economics.
For example, should growth be measured for a country or a region thereof?
Or perhaps a set of countries? What counts as money? Thus, while deci-
sion and game theory are probably the most prominent examples in which
weak and strong compatibility with the data vary, they are not the only ones.
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6 Appendix: Proofs
Proof or Proposition 1.
We reduce the Clique problem to Weak Necessitation. Let there be given
an undirected graph (V;Q) with jV j = n and a number k (1 < k  n). The
set Q  V  V denotes the set of edges. We assume that (v; v) =2 Q for all
v and that (v; w) 2 Q implies (w; v) 2 Q. Construct the following problem.
There is one predicate of degree 1 and one predicate of degree 2 both for
the real and the theoretical model. Formally, F = fK;Lg and FR = fB;Qg
where B;K are single-place predicates and L;Q are two-place predicates.
We abuse notation and use Q for a predicate in our model because it will be
identical to the edges in the graph (V;Q). We allow A (dR) to include only
the abstractions generated by F where F (B) = K and F (Q) = L. (Note
that this A (dR) can be succinctly described.) Thus, there exists only one
acceptable mapping of predicates, and di¤erent mappings will di¤er in their
permutation of entities.
Dene ER = V [ fyg where y =2 V . Let dR be a description (applying to
reality) of the edges in the graph, which says nothing about the predicate B.
That is, for v; w 2 V  ER we have dR ((v; w) ; Q) = 1 i¤ (v; w) 2 Q. For
v 2 V set also dR ((v; y) ; Q) = dR ((y; v) ; Q) = 0. Likewise, dR ((y; y) ; Q) =
0. Finally, set dR (e;B) =  for all e 2 ER. Let E = f1; :::; n+ 1g.
The theory T is given by a single rule: if f1; :::; kg are all pairwise linked
according to L, then predicate K applies to element (n+ 1). Formally, if
d ((i; j) ; L) = 1
for all i; j  k, then T (d) satises
T (d) (n+ 1; K) = 1:
We argue that the original graph has a clique of size k if and only if
there exists a bijection E such that T -A-necessitates (B; y; 1) for A =
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((ER; FR; dR); (E;F; d); ). Indeed, if such a clique exists, E can be dened
by any permutation of the nodes that places the clique nodes in the rst k
places, any permutation that places the rest in the next (n  k) places, and
that maps y to (n+ 1). Theory T can then be used to derive the extension
according to which T (d) (n+ 1; K) = 1 and the mapping back implies that
the extension of dR, d0R, satises d
0
R (y;B) = 1.
Conversely, if T weakly necessitates (y;B; 1), it must be the case that
E (y) = n+1 (as n+1 is the only entity in E for which T may yield such a
conclusion). This means that the entities f1; :::; kg are images of nodes in the
original graph V (and none of them is an image of y) and thus  1E identies
a clique in V .
Finally, observe that the construction of the Weak Necessitation problem
can be done in polynomial time.
Proof of Proposition 2.
We will reduce the (closed) Hamiltonian path problem and prove that
Strong Necessitation is co-NPC. That is, given an undirected graph (V;Q)
we will construct dR 2 D (ER; FR), a pair (e; f) with dR (e; f) = , a value x 2
f0; 1g, a conclusion (e; f; x), and a theory T such that T strongly necessitates
(e; f; x) if and only if the original graph does not have a closed Hamiltonian
path. As in the proof of the previous result, F = fK;Lg and FR = fB;Qg
where B;K are a single-place predicates and L;Q are two-place predicates.
Again, we abuse notation and use Q for a predicate in our model because it
will be identical to the arcs in the graph (V;Q). We allow A (dR) to include
only the abstractions generated by F where F (B) = K and F (Q) = L.
(Note that this A (dR) can be succinctly described.)
Dene ER = V and E = f1; :::; ng for n = jV j. Set
dR (v;B) =  8v 2 V
dR ((v; w) ; Q) = 1 8 (v; w) 2 Q
dR ((v; w) ; Q) = 0 8 (v; w) =2 Q
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The theory T will be dened by n2 rules, each of which might indicate
that a Hamiltonian path has not been found. Specically, for i; j 2 E rule
rij says that, if d ((i; i+ 1) ; L) = 0 (with n+1 = 1) then d (j;K) = 0. Select
v1 2 V . We claim that T strongly necessitates (v1; B; 0) if and only if the
graph (V;Q) does not have a Hamiltonian path.
To see this, consider a permutation of the nodes E : ER( V ) !
E ( f1; :::; ng). If this permutation denes a closed Hamiltonian path, the
theory cannot be applied (because d ((i; i+ 1) ; L) = 1 for all i) and it doesnt
provide any non-trivial extension of d. Consequently, nothing can be added
to dR and, in particular, we remain with dR (v;B) =  8v 2 V . Thus, if
the graph (V;Q) contains a Hamiltonian path, at least one possible model
(permutation of the nodes) will not result in dR (v;B) = 1 and therefore
(v1; B; 0) is not strongly necessitated by T .
Conversely, if a Hamiltonian path does not exist, then, for any permu-
tation of the nodes there exists at least one i for which (i; i+ 1) =2 Q, or
d (L; (i; i+ 1)) = 0, and thus the theory would yield d (j;K) = 0 for all j.
Mapping this conclusion back, we obtain dR (v;B) = 0 for all v, and, in par-
ticular, for v1. As this holds for every mapping , the conclusion (v1; B; 0) is
strongly necessitated by T .
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